Apr 30, 2011

The Jamestown Foundation: Moscow Positioning To Exploit Libya Stalemate

The Jamestown Foundation: Moscow Positioning To Exploit Libya Stalemate

Moscow Positioning To Exploit Libya Stalemate

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 78
April 21, 2011 02:35 PM Age: 8 days
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vlad’s Corner, Home Page, Featured, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, Africa, Europe, Russia

The United States and Western Europe’s residual military powers have undertaken in Libya another war of choice. Russia ushered them into it by not vetoing the UN Security Council’s resolution that authorized the intervention. The conflict quickly turned into a stalemate, which Russia is now positioning to exploit.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has warned the US and NATO against “exceeding the [Security Council] resolution’s mandate. The resolution must be observed, not interpreted abusively as certain countries have done,” Medvedev admonished, adding “What did we concede, in voting for the resolution? A no-fly zone. [But] we got essentially a military operation, not on the ground for the time being, but from the air. And NATO has joined it as a military bloc. But the resolution contains nothing about this. It is a dangerous turn of events. What we see is the misuse of powers laid down in resolution 1973” (Interfax, April 14; www.kremlin.ru, April 18).

In the same statement, made during the BRICS summit in China, Medvedev staked out Russia’s position on managing the conflict in Libya as follows: a ceasefire among the local forces; their separation by an [unspecified] external force; negotiations toward a political-diplomatic solution, as distinct from a military solution; support for the African Union’s ceasefire proposal (which Colonel Muammar Gaddafi accepted while the insurgents rejected it); and continuing consultations on Libya within the UN Security Council (Interfax, April 14).

The Kremlin takes a pragmatic position on regime change in Libya. According to Medvedev, “Muammar Gaddafi has carried out a great many actions, including some that can potentially be interpreted as crimes. Someone [i.e, Gaddafi] might have to take a fateful personal decision to leave. This would be useful in all respects” (Interfax, April 12). Meanwhile, regime change has become a top political objective of the Western belligerents. Moscow’s official statements, however, refer even-handedly to “the opposing sides,” “Tripoli and Benghazi,” or “Tripoli and the insurgent forces” in Libya’s civil war (Interfax, April 12 - 19). Thus, Russia does not press for regime change, but is signaling that it can negotiate its support for such a change.

In line with Medvedev’s position, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls for “strict compliance” with resolution 1973, “avoiding the use of force” [by the US and NATO]; an “immediate ceasefire” between the two Libyan sides; and political dialogue between them under African Union mediation, while “all actions by states and international organizations should be considered by the UN Security Council” (www.mid.ru, April 14, 15; Interfax, April 18).

Russia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergei Lavrov, used the NATO-Russia Council ministerial meeting on April 15 in Berlin to criticize NATO’s involvement in Libya. He reproached Allies for using force beyond the UN Security Council resolution’s mandate, pursuing regime change without a corresponding mandate, and causing civilian casualties through air strikes. Repeatedly he warned that arming or training the insurgents would be treated by Russia as “violations of the UN Security Council resolution.” Lavrov called for an “immediate ceasefire” and shift of focus toward a political and diplomatic settlement in Libya (Interfax, April 15).

Along with these strictures, however, Lavrov welcomed NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s submission of a “detailed report,” to be discussed in the UN Security Council, about how NATO implements the Council’s resolution 1973 on Libya. According to Lavrov, this will enable the Security Council to develop a “unified position” [i.e., one dependent on Russia’s consent] on whether this NATO operation is consistent with the UN mandate, and what steps may be necessary to ensure NATO’s strict observance of the UN mandate (Interfax, April 15; www.mid.ru, April 19).

Moscow must value Rasmussen’s decision to submit such a report to the Security Council, as a precedent to be invoked in the future. Russia seeks to establish the principle that NATO cannot legitimately act without UN Security Council approval, which would necessitate Russia’s approval. “The Security Council will render its collective judgment,” Lavrov intoned. If so, veto-wielding Russia will join those sitting in judgment over the NATO alliance. Moscow is interested in drawing NATO into a long-term process of erosion of authority. Russia’s verdict may even be clement in the initial stage, so as to encourage continuation of such a process.

Russia’s envoy to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, has accused NATO of causing itself a “humanitarian crisis” through air strikes on Libya’s civilian infrastructure. Rogozin warned that any arms supplies to insurgents or ground operations, “which will presumably be portrayed as humanitarian,” would violate the Security Council’s resolution on Libya. He noted the “internal split within the NATO alliance, [which] could subsequently lead to a profound political crisis,” resulting from the Libya operation. Addressing NATO’s European member countries involved in this operation (most are not directly involved), Rogozin warned that they are “slowly but surely being drawn into a new big war” (RIA Novosti, April 18, 19).

Four weeks into the air strike campaign, Moscow is adopting a pose of more-humanitarian-than-thou vis-à-vis the Western belligerents. Deploring civilian deaths and destruction of infrastructure, particularly from “massive strikes by coalition forces,” Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry is urging all sides to observe international humanitarian law and the UN resolution’s mandate to “protect the population” of Libya (Interfax, April 18).

On April 15, US President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy jointly published a column syndicated in the European press, declaring that Gaddafi’s renunciation of power is a preliminary condition for a political solution to the conflict. While the Kremlin ponders its response, Lavrov has retorted that “those who use the adopted resolution to justify regime change are manifestly violating the UN Security Council’s mandate.” Moscow seems prepared to differentiate between externally-driven regime change and Gaddafi’s personal departure, opposing the former but amenable to the latter. As Lavrov restated, Russia insists on a negotiated solution involving both parties to the Libyan conflict (Interfax, April 19).

Russia has officially endorsed the BRICS’ and African Union’s calls to maintain Libya’s territorial unity. However, Russia is not repeating such calls in its own name. Thus, Moscow seems flexible about a possible de facto partition of Libya, which is being discussed informally in the West as a sub-optimal possible result of this military intervention. For its part, Russia is urging an immediate cease-fire in place and a mediated dialogue between Tripoli and Benghazi. Such an approach can lead to an unofficial partition of the country.

The Jamestown Foundation: Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya

The Jamestown Foundation: Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya

Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 83
April 29, 2011 03:38 PM Age: 3 hrs

Russia has signaled that it can leverage its veto in the UN Security Council to entrap NATO in a protracted conflict in Libya. On April 26, Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergei Lavrov, told the media that Russia would not support a new Security Council resolution, if this leads to further escalation of the civil war and further interference from the outside in Libya. However, Moscow would support a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, a stop to all violence, and for the two Libyan sides to start negotiations immediately (Interfax, April 26).

Thus, Russia would veto a Security Council authorization for NATO/US military assistance to the rebels or intervention on the ground. However, Moscow would approve gelling the stalemate, negotiations with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s government (and with Gaddafi himself, at least initially), and de facto partition of Libya along ceasefire lines. Western belligerents will face this outcome unless they win the war quickly by committing massive force, rather than allowing Moscow to veto NATO’s own decisions.

President Dmitry Medvedev has accepted Greece’s proposal (almost certainly inspired by Moscow itself) for Russia to offer “mediation assistance” in the crisis (EDM, April 26). Moscow has also opened a communication channel with Tripoli at the public level. Following Lavrov’s officially reported telephone conversation with Libyan Prime Minister, Baghdadi al-Mahmudi, Russia Today state-owned TV interviewed Libyan government spokesman Musa Ibrahim. Welcoming Moscow’s statements, Ibrahim requested Russia to convene an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss NATO bombing of Libyan civilian sites and attempts to kill Colonel Gaddafi. Tripoli also wants Russia to send observers to Libya for fact-finding and coordination with BRICS countries (Interfax, Al-Jamahiriyah TV, April 26).

Russia is giving the Western belligerents some slack for now, while positioning itself as a possible arbiter. Deputy Minister Gennadi Gatilov has replied that a Security Council meeting is not foreseen, and Russia does not intend to send observers to Libya at this time (Itar-Tass, April 28). Meanwhile, Moscow is building up its arbiter’s credentials on a daily basis through equidistant diplomatic statements and attempts to seize a high moral ground.

Moscow’s theses are: 1) Both sides are firing indiscriminately, killing innocent Libyan people every day. 2) NATO aviation strikes both military objects and civilian infrastructure, in Tripoli and other cities; the US and NATO have taken sides in an internal Libyan conflict. 3) both the use of military force against unarmed protesters, and intervention from outside for regime-change, are unacceptable. 4) The air strikes, as well as taking sides in the civil war, are incompatible with UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 5) NATO and the US ought to observe the terms of that resolution, call a ceasefire, and promote inter-Libyan dialogue, with external support but without external interference (www.mid.ru, Interfax, April 26 - 29).

Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, insists that the air strikes on Libya are killing people and destroying civilian infrastructure, while the attempts to kill Gaddafi are illegal. “As I see it, we should act responsibly, with consideration for civilians. However, the so-called civilized community attacks a small country and destroys its infrastructure,” Putin admonishes (www.premier.gov.ru, Interfax, April 26, 27).

Russia made the US/NATO military intervention in Libya possible in the first place, by abstaining in the UN Security council vote on resolution 1973, rather than vetoing it. Russia’s March 27 abstention was a diplomatic masterstroke, poorly understood at that point by the Obama administration, which credited its “reset” for the Russian green light. As Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, spelled it out: By abstaining, Russia has positioned itself to demand full observance of the resolution’s provisions by those who voted for it, and without sharing responsibility with those countries for the political consequences of their intervention (EDM, April 25).

As it turns out, the Western belligerents have undertaken this operation with insufficient forces; the US has withdrawn its most effective strike planes prematurely from action; and NATO -- to which the US has largely devolved the operation -- fights with one hand tied behind its back, unable to reinforce and escalate as long as Russia does not approve this via the UN Security Council, or by some tacit arrangement.

Arming the rebels is a poor option because it would simply prolong the conflict without a decisive outcome, absent of a massive US/NATO offensive. The top rebel commander, General Abdel Fattah Yunis, has rushed to Brussels, with a shopping list of weapons for insurgent forces that are yet to be trained. “We don’t mean light arms,” Yunis clarified for the press in Brussels. He wants Apache helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and torpedo boats for the rebel forces. “NATO has everything,” he judged (Interfax, April 28).

Russia will not necessarily or permanently veto a massive US/NATO offensive. Moscow will almost certainly negotiate its position, seeking trade-offs on issues of priority interest to Russia. For the time being, it can de facto tolerate an incremental escalation of offensive operations, insufficient for Western belligerents to win quickly, but sufficient to entangle them in yet another protracted conflict. If this scenario materializes, Moscow plans to emerge in some mediator’s role above the fray. And irrespective of the tempo of military operations, Russia is set to collect a windfall on European oil and gas markets, due to the halt in Libyan supplies for an indefinite period.

The Jamestown Foundation: Russia Unveils Political Objectives In Libya

The Jamestown Foundation: Russia Unveils Political Objectives In Libya

Russia Unveils Political Objectives In Libya

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 78
April 21, 2011 02:55 PM Age: 8 days

(Getty Images)

Russia’s abstention on the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 helped open the door to Western military action on a limited scale in Libya. The Obama administration led the military action initially, under its rubric of humanitarian intervention and an assumed responsibility to protect. Barring a decisive military intervention, however, the US and its European allies face the possibility of a protracted, “frozen conflict” on African soil.

The administration received Russia’s abstention in the Security Council with relief and gratitude for not blocking the resolution. Washington fell back on kremlinology to interpret Moscow’s decision, crediting it to President Dmitry Medvedev allegedly prevailing over Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on this issue. However, it is Medvedev who has started throwing spokes into the Western intervention’s wheels (“Moscow Positioning To Exploit Libya Stalemate,” EDM, April 21).

Russia seeks to cast itself as an arbiter of the situation and interpreter of the UN resolution. Watching NATO’s discomfiture over Libya with barely hidden satisfaction, Moscow almost certainly calculates that Western belligerents will either bog down in a protracted stalemate, or alternatively escalate their military operations for a decisive outcome. Military escalation would (not only in Russia’s view) again require UN Security Council authorization. This would in turn enable Moscow to seek trade-offs with the United States and NATO on issues unrelated to Libya, but of priority interest to Russia.

The European Union looks as hesitant in its own sphere of competencies as NATO in its own. France and Britain are acting in their national capacities on Libya, without reference to EU common policies (and only in a nominal NATO framework). In early April, the European Council (EU’s top decision-making authority) agreed in principle to send EU-flagged troops to Libya. Their mission would involve escorting internal refugees to safety and protecting humanitarian aid cargoes sent by international organizations to Libya. On April 19, however, the EU announced that it would only proceed if the United Nations requests such action. The EU is prepared to deploy a maximum of 1,000 troops for a humanitarian mission along those lines (press release, April 19).

Moscow would undoubtedly welcome a stalemate of indefinite duration in Libya. The Western belligerents, after serial misjudgments, need a speedy solution to vindicate a humanitarian mission, economize their scarce military resources, trigger regime-change, and re-start Libya’s oil and gas production as fast as possible. Russia, however, can exploit a situation in which neither side wins or loses, the US and NATO need Moscow’s cooperation for a face-saving solution, and Russia profits from higher energy prices in Europe while Libyan production dries up (Andrew McGregor, “It Didn’t Start This Way, but It’s a War for Oil Now,” The Jamestown Foundation, April 18).

To ensure a stalemate, Russia has clearly indicated that it would block UN Security Council authorization for offensive operations on the ground, or assistance to insurgents. But Russia is also undoubtedly prepared to consider facilitating a political solution, if linked with Russian interests. Moscow carefully avoids any appearance of acting unilaterally in this process. It constantly invokes the UN Security Council’s collective authority (holding the threat of a unilateral veto in the background) and acts in consultation with the five BRICS countries. Four of these abstained on the Security Council’s resolution 1973, as did Russia; and all five BRICS support a local, rather than Western-driven, solution in Libya.

Based on statements by Medvedev, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov, and other officials (“Moscow Positioning to Exploit Libya Stalemate,” EDM, April 21), Russian objectives at this stage in the Libya conflict can be summed up as follows:

1. An early ceasefire in place, to be followed by mediated negotiations between Muammar Gaddafi’s government and the insurgents. Russia opposes regime change in Tripoli, but seems noncommittal on two key issues: Gaddafi’s personal departure from power and Libya’s territorial unity. With or without Gaddafi, an early ceasefire in place would result in dividing Libya de facto into eastern and western territories, pending an uncertain outcome of negotiations between Tripoli and Benghazi.

2. Adherence to the UN Security Council’s existing mandate, which is limited to enforcement of a no-fly zone. Russia tolerates US/NATO air strikes in support of the outgunned insurgents, but opposes any ground operations, or arms supplies and training, to the same insurgents. Such prohibitions ensure the military superiority of pro-government forces, while the air strikes merely help the insurgents to fight defensively. Thus, Russian policy favors an inconclusive, open-ended civil conflict in Libya.

3. No legitimate US/NATO actions without the UN Security Council’s, i.e. Russia’s, consent. Russia wants the Security Council to evaluate NATO’s compliance with the relevant resolutions on Libya. Such deference to the United Nations (instrumental in Moscow, ideological in the Obama administration) can open a way for Russia to affect NATO policy decisions through its role in the UN Security Council.

4. A halt on Libyan oil and gas supplies to the European continent. Russia gains from the unexpected interruption of those supplies and is interested in a prolonged halt. This has become, tacitly but indubitably, a Russian objective in the Libya crisis. Thanks to this conflict, Russia free-rides on higher prices for its oil and gas; it can increase its market share in Italy, Austria, Germany, and potentially other European countries; and gains more lobbying power for Russian energy projects that increase European dependence on Russian supplies.

Beyond the objectives linked directly with this conflict, Moscow has a broader interest in seeing the US and NATO tied down in wars of choice and other protracted confrontations. These increase Russia’s leeway for action in ex-Soviet territories, Russia’s top priority. Moscow must welcome the disproportionate allocation of Western resources to expeditionary wars from shrinking defense budgets in NATO Europe, where lack of military investment stands in contrast with Russia’s ambitious military modernization

The Jamestown Foundation: Russia Offers “Mediation Services” in Libya Crisis

The Jamestown Foundation: Russia Offers “Mediation Services” in Libya Crisis

Russia Offers “Mediation Services” in Libya Crisis

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 81
April 26, 2011 03:26 PM Age: 3 days

Russia is moving fast to gel the stalemate in Libya, pin down the US and NATO there, and exploit their predicament by casting itself as a conflict-resolution facilitator (EDM, April 21).

Moscow is in a hurry because time is not yet on its side. NATO and the US can still escape that protracted-conflict scenario if they succeed in killing Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his entourage with luckier air strikes than that attempted on April 25; or (failing this) if they mount themselves without delay a decisive operation on the ground (which Russia has made clear that it would condemn).

To entrap the Western allies in a long-term stalemate, Moscow is calling for a cease-fire in place, with mediated negotiations among the Libyan parties to the conflict, and banning all forms of US/NATO military action not authorized by the UN Security Council (i.e., by veto-wielding Russia). Moscow’s most urgent priority is to block any Western military operations, or arming and training insurgents. In Moscow’s interpretation, UN Security Council resolutions no. 1970 and no. 1973 preclude all these forms of Western involvement.

Toward those ends, Russia is now offering its mediation services.

On April 22, Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, used a telephone call from Greek Prime Minister, Giorgios Papandreou, to convey Russia’s offer of “mediation assistance” in the Libya crisis. According to Medvedev, a solution must urgently be sought, exclusively through peaceful means, and strictly within the UN Security Council’s resolutions and mandate (i.e., precluding further Western military involvement) (www.kreml.ru, Interfax, April 22). On April 14, Medvedev had become the first Russian official to raise strong public objections to the US/NATO intervention in Libya (Interfax, www.kreml.ru, April 14; EDM, April 21). Apparently, the Kremlin used the conversation with Papandreou to convey its message to certain other parties.

On April 23, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, and Libya’s Prime Minister, Baghdadi al-Mahmudi, had a telephone conversation. Al-Mahmudi inquired about possible Russian facilitation of a peaceful political solution. Lavrov and Al-Mahmudi agreed on the main prerequisites: full compliance with the Security Council’s resolutions, an end to strikes on Misurata and all populated localities by all sides, immediate ceasefire, and negotiations to be mediated by the African Union and the United Nations, which Russia is ready to assist. In Moscow’s official readout, the Libyan government fully agrees with all of these points (www.mid.ru, April 24; Interfax, April 25).

According to Moscow’s announcement, the telephone conversation took place at the Libyan side’s request. In Tripoli’s version, it was Lavrov who called Al-Mahmudi (the two versions are not necessarily conflicting). Tripoli’s version corroborates Moscow’s, but seems fuller. It adds, citing Lavrov, that Russia is prepared to contribute observers to a cease-fire monitoring mission in Libya, and it has informed the UN about this. Moscow is also purportedly ready to receive a special envoy from Libya (Al-Jamahiriyah TV, April 23).

Moscow calculates that Western belligerents will either bog down in a protracted stalemate, or alternatively feel compelled to escalate military operations for a decisive outcome. Military escalation would (not only in Russia’s view) again require UN Security Council authorization. This would in turn enable Moscow to seek trade-offs with the United States and NATO on issues unrelated to Libya, but of priority interest to Russia. To ensure a stalemate, Russia has clearly indicated that it would block UN Security Council authorization of offensive operations on the ground, or assistance to insurgents.

Practically on a daily basis, while in Moscow or abroad, Lavrov remonstrates that the US and NATO air strikes are exceeding the UN Security Council’s resolution no. 1973. He has adopted an equidistant tone, chastising all strikes on populated localities, and charging that the Western intervention supports one of the two Libyan parties, instead of being impartial. Moscow further insist that the arms embargo, under Security Council resolution no. 1970, covers non-lethal equipment, as well as military instructors, and applies to Libya’s entire territory [i.e, including Benghazi], “in Russia’s interpretation” (Lavrov). Medvedev, who had set the tone of such remonstrations, returned to the issue when receiving UN Secretary, Ban Ki-Moon, on April 22 in Moscow. The Russian president called for “strict compliance” with the Security Council’s resolutions on Libya, and a “clearer formulation of UN mandates in general” (www.kreml.ru, April 22; www.mid.ru, Interfax, April 22, 25).

Moscow is reserving its position on the key issues of Gaddafi’s personal departure, regime change, and Libya’s territorial unity. Russian statements implicitly suggest a readiness to hold talks with Gaddafi’s government, or mediate between Tripoli and Benghazi, as part of some international effort that could undercut the ongoing Western efforts. Playing a relatively weak hand with consummate skill, Russia will use its UN Security Council veto power to block any decisive Western military action. Moscow’s tactics are indirectly shielding the Tripoli government, while ensuring that the insurgents stay in the fight but only defensively. This is Moscow’s prescription for stalemate in Libya.

However, Russia has not protested too loudly against US/NATO military actions that exceed the UN mandate to some extent. Moscow is signaling that it can accept such actions within certain limits. Almost certainly, it expects in return Western deference to Russian interests elsewhere. In the Afghanistan war and the US-Iran protracted confrontation, Russia has fostered perceptions that the US and NATO “need” Russia strategically.

Ultimately, Russia’s position on Libya will be up for negotiation and trade-offs, at third-parties’ expense in the worst case, if the stalemate becomes chronic. With NATO’s credibility recklessly on the line, Moscow will exploit a situation in which the Alliance bogs down and expends its scarce resources in Libya.

US and NATO involvement in the Libya conflict was haphazard and, in many ways, irrational from the outset. At this point, however, decisive military action on the ground is the only way for the US and NATO to avoid a “frozen conflict” on African soil.

The European Council on Foreign Relations | EU foreign policy: Moving on from Libya

The European Council on Foreign Relations | EU foreign policy: Moving on from Libya

EU foreign policy: Moving on from Libya

For many observers, the sense of déjà vu at the moment is overwhelming. Member states of the European Union are once again bitterly divided – this time about Libya. As a result, the Brussels institutions, including the ones created with great fanfare by the Lisbon treaty, are trapped between warring capitals. Some claim that Europe has made no progress whatsoever in becoming a foreign policy actor since the dark days of Bosnia in the early 1990s.

However, European leaders should not be despondent. Europe can be an effective foreign-policy actor when it wants to be, as the European foreign policy Scorecard 2010, which is released this week by the European Council on Foreign Relations, shows. The study systematically evaluates and grades the performance of Europeans – member states and EU institutions taken together – in their external relations.

Unsurprisingly, the EU performs badly where it is internally divided. The worst grades in the scorecard are for relations with Turkey and Russia, human rights policy, and European action in the G20. On the other hand, however, the EU does have a substantial acquis diplomatique on issues like the Balkans, visa policy, Iran, or climate change. While the scorecard partly confirms the idea that Europe is a “herbivorous” power, in other words one better at issues of "low politics" than "high politics" (for example the EU gets good grades on trade, standards and norms), Europe also gets satisfactory scores on issues of war and peace such as Iran, Somalia or Georgia.

We also found a strong pattern in the results. Europe is doing better in areas where it has been bitterly divided in the past, has failed miserably, but has been forced to put in place adequate tools and to harmonise national positions that were at first very far apart from one another. Good examples include the Balkans, where the EU gets good grades even though all issues are not resolved; its strong and united policy vis-à-vis Iran, which was largely a reaction to the Iraq debacle; its improved strategy for the Cancún climate change meeting after the disastrous Copenhagen one; or its united response to the Liu Xiaobo Nobel peace prize ceremony after the incoherent attitude to the Olympics Games in Beijing. This pattern of failure and humiliation before success, it should be noted, is far from restricted to foreign policy, as was demonstrated in the recent weeks by the comprehensive package found for the euro crisis.

In the Libya case, Europe has failed to speak with one voice. It has little experience dealing politically in a collective way with this region - there is no acquis diplomatique there. It is at the beginning of the learning curve: current events will force Europeans to get their act together as they did in the Balkans. In a few years from now, we may witness a more common policy towards our Southern neighbourhood, which is important for reasons of security, energy and immigration.

The two questions, then, are how Europe can develop a common policy before – rather than after - it becomes a crisis, and, in case this fails regardless, how it can shorten the cycle of humiliation before success. What makes the Libya case different from previous crises is the existence of the Lisbon institutions, which could be put to good use for these two objectives.

First, in order to avoid the phase of bitter division, and try to get the benefits of a crisis without the pain, the EU should put in place a systematic exchange of analysis and evaluations between national diplomats and the new External Action Service. Second, the Service should organise exercises and crisis simulations on the main areas of potential future problems to detect those where European views diverge the most – something the ECFR Scorecard helps mapping with precision.

But when it's too late and the divisions have come out in the open, the EU should adopt mechanisms that enable it to "agree to disagree" while remaining operational – the Kosovo situation, where strong diverging views among member states don't prevent coherent action, is a good example of this. That is where the Lisbon Treaty institutions should offer new solutions for Libya and for future crises. In the short term, however, it is up to the national capitals to quickly narrow their differences over Libya and start building an acquis diplomatique there as well.

This article was first published on Open Democracy's website.

EUobserver / France and Italy get backing for changes to EU border rules

EUobserver / France and Italy get backing for changes to EU border rules

France and Italy get backing for changes to EU border rules

Old French passport: the proposed rollback of EU border freedoms has been prompted by north African migrants (Photo: letterlust)

HONOR MAHONY

28.04.2011 @ 09:25 CET

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - Several member states have indicated they are prepared to back attempts by France and Italy to make it easier for countries to re-instate border controls, following an influx of migrants from north Africa.

Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Malta have all given their blessing to Paris and Rome's call for adjustments to be made to the Schengen Agreement on passport-free travel within most of the EU, while underlining the importance of an "open Europe".

"If you can improve the Schengen system then that is good and you should," German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle said Wednesday, reports AFP. "But travel freedom in Europe is such an important achievement that it should not be up for renegotiation."

In a parliamentary debate, Dutch Immigration Minister Gerd Leers said: "I will resist those who call for simply re-instating border controls, for that goes against an open Europe, but I welcome the debate on how to strengthen and improve the Schengen rules to combat illegal immigration, especially in these times of turmoil. "

Malta and Greece stressed the need for other member states to show 'solidarity' with southern rim EU countries. The tiny Mediterranean island of Malta is often a first port-of-call for migrants from Africa while Greece is struggling to secure its border with Turkey.

"I'm in favour of review providing it reduces the burden and does not make it heavier," said Tonio Borg, Malta's deputy prime minister. "I hope the revision of the Schengen treaty will not mean creating walls and gates, but a move toward solidarity," he said.

Greek Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas said: "Greece is open to a revision of Schengen, but that should help Mediterranean countries."

Southern European countries have long complained that the rest of Europe is deaf to their complaints of struggling to cope with receiving immigrants.

The tension came to a head in recent weeks when Italy - having seen thousands of people, mainly Tunisians, reach its coast - decided to start granting temporary residence permits. Many of the migrants began to head to France, which reacted by closing its borders.

In a meeting designed to calm tensions, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi Tuesday (26 April) issued a joint declaration calling for border controls to be re-introduced in exceptional circumstances.

The European Commission has said it will define such exceptional situations and is expected to put forward proposals next week (4 May). EU officials have repeatedly stressed however that border controls will not be re-instated as a matter of routine.

Most EU states as well as Norway, Switzerland and Iceland are signatories to the 1995 Schengen Agreement. Abolishing the internal border controls, except in cases of threats to national security, the agreement relies on trust between member states but this has been put to the test both by the recent immigration flows in the wake of the Arab Spring as well as the rise of far-right anti-immigration parties in several member states.

Apr 29, 2011

The Jamestown Foundation: Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya

The Jamestown Foundation: Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya

Russia Placing Itself Above the Fray in Libya

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 83
April 29, 2011 03:38 PM Age: 2 hrs
Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vlad’s Corner, Home Page, Featured, Foreign Policy, Military/Security, Africa, Middle East, Russia
Russia has signaled that it can leverage its veto in the UN Security Council to entrap NATO in a protracted conflict in Libya. On April 26, Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergei Lavrov, told the media that Russia would not support a new Security Council resolution, if this leads to further escalation of the civil war and further interference from the outside in Libya. However, Moscow would support a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, a stop to all violence, and for the two Libyan sides to start negotiations immediately (Interfax, April 26).

Thus, Russia would veto a Security Council authorization for NATO/US military assistance to the rebels or intervention on the ground. However, Moscow would approve gelling the stalemate, negotiations with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s government (and with Gaddafi himself, at least initially), and de facto partition of Libya along ceasefire lines. Western belligerents will face this outcome unless they win the war quickly by committing massive force, rather than allowing Moscow to veto NATO’s own decisions.

President Dmitry Medvedev has accepted Greece’s proposal (almost certainly inspired by Moscow itself) for Russia to offer “mediation assistance” in the crisis (EDM, April 26). Moscow has also opened a communication channel with Tripoli at the public level. Following Lavrov’s officially reported telephone conversation with Libyan Prime Minister, Baghdadi al-Mahmudi, Russia Today state-owned TV interviewed Libyan government spokesman Musa Ibrahim. Welcoming Moscow’s statements, Ibrahim requested Russia to convene an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss NATO bombing of Libyan civilian sites and attempts to kill Colonel Gaddafi. Tripoli also wants Russia to send observers to Libya for fact-finding and coordination with BRICS countries (Interfax, Al-Jamahiriyah TV, April 26).

Russia is giving the Western belligerents some slack for now, while positioning itself as a possible arbiter. Deputy Minister Gennadi Gatilov has replied that a Security Council meeting is not foreseen, and Russia does not intend to send observers to Libya at this time (Itar-Tass, April 28). Meanwhile, Moscow is building up its arbiter’s credentials on a daily basis through equidistant diplomatic statements and attempts to seize a high moral ground.

Moscow’s theses are: 1) Both sides are firing indiscriminately, killing innocent Libyan people every day. 2) NATO aviation strikes both military objects and civilian infrastructure, in Tripoli and other cities; the US and NATO have taken sides in an internal Libyan conflict. 3) both the use of military force against unarmed protesters, and intervention from outside for regime-change, are unacceptable. 4) The air strikes, as well as taking sides in the civil war, are incompatible with UN Security Council Resolution 1973. 5) NATO and the US ought to observe the terms of that resolution, call a ceasefire, and promote inter-Libyan dialogue, with external support but without external interference (www.mid.ru, Interfax, April 26 - 29).

Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, insists that the air strikes on Libya are killing people and destroying civilian infrastructure, while the attempts to kill Gaddafi are illegal. “As I see it, we should act responsibly, with consideration for civilians. However, the so-called civilized community attacks a small country and destroys its infrastructure,” Putin admonishes (www.premier.gov.ru, Interfax, April 26, 27).

Russia made the US/NATO military intervention in Libya possible in the first place, by abstaining in the UN Security council vote on resolution 1973, rather than vetoing it. Russia’s March 27 abstention was a diplomatic masterstroke, poorly understood at that point by the Obama administration, which credited its “reset” for the Russian green light. As Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, spelled it out: By abstaining, Russia has positioned itself to demand full observance of the resolution’s provisions by those who voted for it, and without sharing responsibility with those countries for the political consequences of their intervention (EDM, April 25).

As it turns out, the Western belligerents have undertaken this operation with insufficient forces; the US has withdrawn its most effective strike planes prematurely from action; and NATO -- to which the US has largely devolved the operation -- fights with one hand tied behind its back, unable to reinforce and escalate as long as Russia does not approve this via the UN Security Council, or by some tacit arrangement.

Arming the rebels is a poor option because it would simply prolong the conflict without a decisive outcome, absent of a massive US/NATO offensive. The top rebel commander, General Abdel Fattah Yunis, has rushed to Brussels, with a shopping list of weapons for insurgent forces that are yet to be trained. “We don’t mean light arms,” Yunis clarified for the press in Brussels. He wants Apache helicopters, anti-tank missiles, and torpedo boats for the rebel forces. “NATO has everything,” he judged (Interfax, April 28).

Russia will not necessarily or permanently veto a massive US/NATO offensive. Moscow will almost certainly negotiate its position, seeking trade-offs on issues of priority interest to Russia. For the time being, it can de facto tolerate an incremental escalation of offensive operations, insufficient for Western belligerents to win quickly, but sufficient to entangle them in yet another protracted conflict. If this scenario materializes, Moscow plans to emerge in some mediator’s role above the fray. And irrespective of the tempo of military operations, Russia is set to collect a windfall on European oil and gas markets, due to the halt in Libyan supplies for an indefinite period.

Apr 27, 2011

Putin, Gaddafi, and Totalitarian Humanism

Putin, Gaddafi, and Totalitarian Humanism

Medvedev slams Putin's 'inexcusable' Libya 'crusade' comments

The Christian Science Monitor
Fred Weir
22 March 2011

Moscow – Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev exchanged sharp words Monday over the true nature of Western military intervention in Libya, leading many observers to wonder whether the gloves have finally come off in the long-anticipated battle over which of them will run for president in elections that are just one year away.

Though the two have sparred indirectly before, they have publicly maintained that everything is fine with the "tandem" arrangement under which they have jointly run Russia since Mr. Putin handpicked Mr. Medvedev to succeed him as president three years ago.

Both men have said they'd like to run again for what will be a six-year presidential term next year, and have insisted that they will decide amicably between themselves which of them will be the establishment candidate – a status that virtually guarantees success in Russia's heavily stage-managed political culture.

Putin croons like Sinatra: Top 7 marquee moments

Perhaps it's not so amicable anymore.

The tough public words were exchanged over an issue of foreign policy, which is a presidential prerogative under Russia's Constitution. While answering questions from defense workers Monday, Putin slammed the Western-authored United Nations resolution that authorized the use of force to protect Libyan civilians from forces loyal to Muammar Qaddafi as allowing "anyone to do anything they want" against a sovereign state.

"It resembles a medieval appeal for a crusade in which somebody calls upon somebody to go to a certain place and liberate it," Putin said. "This is becoming a persistent tendency in US policy," mentioning the bombing of Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo war, and subsequent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. "Now it is Libya’s turn, under the pretext of protecting the peaceful population. But in bomb strikes it is precisely the civilian population that gets killed. Where is the logic and the conscience?"

A few hours later Medvedev weighed in. Without naming Putin, he made clear that he disagreed with both his tone and the implication that Western powers are acting improperly in Libya.

"It is absolutely inexcusable to use expressions that, in effect, lead to a clash of civilizations, such as 'crusades,' and so on. That is unacceptable," Medvedev said. "All that is now happening in Libya is the result of the appalling behavior of the Libyan leadership and the crimes it committed against its own people."

Russian diplomats did not veto the authorization of force resolution when it came before the Security Council because "I do not consider this resolution to be wrong," he added.

Divergent viewsThose two sharply divergent foreign policy views – one bristling with suspicion toward the West, the other frankly identifying Russia's interests with it – have long been on display in Moscow. But never before have Medvedev and Putin so clearly moved into separate corners in what looks like the prelude to a real fight, analysts say.

Is Putin proving himself a man who understands the "Totalitarian Humanism" of America and Western Europe?


Apr 25, 2011

Trump Electrifies CPAC and Infuriates Paul Supporters - Donald Trump - Fox Nation

Trump Electrifies CPAC and Infuriates Paul Supporters - Donald Trump - Fox Nation

Trump Electrifies CPAC and Infuriates Paul Supporters


If CPAC is a primary for self-confidence, Donald Trump won hands down.
The real-estate mogul with a genius for self-promotion gave the most-acclaimed - and most colorful - speech at the conservative gathering this afternoon, from the moment he took the stage to the song "Money, Money, Money."

Apr 20, 2011

У Росії підозрюють, що Янукович заразився «помаранчевою хворобою» - Новини - Український тиждень

У Росії підозрюють, що Янукович заразився «помаранчевою хворобою» - Новини - Український тиждень

У Росії підозрюють, що Янукович заразився «помаранчевою хворобою»

Керівництво України гальмує вступ країни до Митного союзу Росії, Білорусі і Казахстану, заразившись «помаранчевою ідеологією». Про це заявив в інтерв`ю УНІАН депутат Держдуми Росії Сергій Марков.

«Рішення про вступ до Митного союзу не ухвалюється тому, що продовжується панування багато в чому помаранчевої ідеології. Ціна ідеологічних помилок – $10 млрд. на рік. Це ціна відсутності програми деоранжизації українського суспільства», - переконаний Марков.

На його думку, суспільство і еліта України «заражені помаранчевими ідеологічними хворобами».

«Ідеологію євроінтеграції не викреслено. Досі стоїть як мета членство в ЄС. Янукович не обдурює українців, він й справді вірить у цю можливість. Керівництво України розуміє, що вступити до ЄС не так легко, але вірить, що це можливо. Усе це свідчить, що помаранчева ідеологія все ще міцна», - сказав Марков.

Він вважає, що членство України в Європейському Союзі неможливе ані через 10, ані через 15, ані через 20 років.

«Величезна частина української еліти вважає, що це можливо. Вони справді вірять Ющенку, і Янукович вірить Ющенку у тому, що вступ до ЄС можливий», - сказав Марков.

На його переконання, Митний союз і зону вільної торгівлі з ЄС сумістити не можна.

«Ми зацікавлені розвиватися спільно з Україною. З ким нам ще розвиватися? А ЄС на Україну наплювати, і нічого він вам не дасть, обдурить, виб`ють преференції своїм товаром, а Україну не пустять на ринок», - вважає Марков.

Він підкреслив, що одними з найважливіших галузей України є сільське господарство і металургія, але коли «загинаються» Греція, Португалія та Іспанія, ніхто не пустить українську продукцію на свій ринок.

«Кожен проданий український помідор означає непроданий іспанський, португальський чи грецький. За кожний цей непроданий помідор німецькому уряду доведеться давати дотації», - упевнений Марков.

На думку Маркова, у результаті вступу до Митного союзу Україна зможе реанімувати цивільне авіабудування, включитися у виробництво військових літаків у кооперації з Росією. Крім того, будуть завантажені суднобудівні заводи України, об`єднано ринки сільськогосподарської продукції та інших видів товарів, зазначив він.

Водночас, офіційна Варшава зацікавлена в тому, щоб Україна підписала угоду про асоціацією з ЄС за її головування в Європейському Союзі, яке розпочнеться за два місяці.

Нагадаємо, під час зустрічі у Києві з президентом Європейської комісії Жозе Мануел Баррозу, Віктор Янукович заявив, що Україна має стратегічний план інтеграції до ЄС, і цей план підкріплений законом України про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики.

Apr 19, 2011

Why Does Roger Ailes Hate America? - Esquire

Print - Why Does Roger Ailes Hate America? - Esquire

Why Does Roger Ailes Hate America?

An exclusive and unbiased investigation into the highly paid operative of a foreign-born tycoon, a man who reengineered political and media culture and fomented a revolt that threatens the very stability of our country

By Tom Junod
Thomas Porostocky
Published in the February 2011 issue
Today, here at Esquire — and only at Esquire, because only Esquire has the guts to tell you this story — we're going to tell you about a man you need to know a little better, maybe a lot better: a man named Roger Ailes. Maybe you've heard of Mr. Ailes. As the chairman and CEO of a well financed and admittedly antigovernment organization called Fox News, he made a reported $23 million in 2009, which, to do the math, was not just more money than you earned, it was more money than everyone related to you earned, combined, even if you count the sudden windfall that came your aunt Ida's way after she got five out of six in Powerball.

Apr 17, 2011

Misrata becomes Libya's Stalingrad - Africa, World - The Independent

Misrata becomes Libya's Stalingrad - Africa, World - The Independent

Misrata becomes Libya's Stalingrad

The brutality of attacks on the rebel city reveal how important reclaiming the port is to Col Gaddafi
By Kim Sengupta
Sunday, 17 April 2011
A Libyan rebel fighter in Misrata market on Friday. The roof has been peppered by bullets and the shops are all closed
afp/getty images
A Libyan rebel fighter in Misrata market on Friday. The roof has been peppered by bullets and the shops are all closed
The "dawn chorus" came in on time, salvos of missiles crashing down with shattering noise, burning buildings, killing and maiming people. It was the start of another day in Misrata, the city whose fate may decide the military outcome of this brutal civil war.
The besieged and battered bastion has become Libya's Stalingrad. The fall of Misrata would not only be a huge symbolic and psychological triumph for Muammar Gaddafi, but also end significant opposition to his rule in the west of the country.

Sarkozy election campaign was funded by Libya – Gaddafi son | The Guardian

Sarkozy election campaign was funded by Libya – Gaddafi son | World news | The Guardian
Saif al-Islam threatens to publish details of bank transfers to punish French PM for backing Libyan rebels 
Ian Black in Tripoli and Kim Willsher in Paris  
guardian.co.uk,
    Saif al-Islam Gaddafi
    Saif al-Islam Gaddafi: 'Give us back our money.' Photograph: Sabri Elmhedwi/EPA
    Muammar Gaddafi's son has claimed that Libya helped finance Nicolas Sarkozy's successful election campaign in 2007, and demanded that the French president return the money to "the Libyan people". In an interview with the Euronews TV channel, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi said Libya had details of bank transfers and was ready to make them public in a move designed to punish Sarkozy for throwing his weight behind opposition forces.

Apr 13, 2011

EUobserver / Foreign ministers wary of EU military role in Libya

EUobserver / Foreign ministers wary of EU military role in Libya

Foreign ministers wary of EU military role in Libya

Libya from space - the EU mission awaits a green light from the UN (Photo: nasa.gov)
12.04.2011 @ 22:12 CET
EUOBSERVER / LUXEMBOURG - Foreign ministers have sketched out the basic outlines of an EU 'military-humanitarian' mission to Libya, amid concern about putting ground soldiers into a volatile situation.
The meeting in Luxembourg on Tuesday (12 March) saw ministers discuss the so-called concept of operations (Conops) for the Eufor Libya mission, the first step in the planning of any mission which involves military assets.