Nov 22, 2009

EU-RussiaCentre.org

EU-RussiaCentre.org
Elena Prokhorova

A checklist of “No-Go” areas for the West

28 Aug 2008 — by Elena Prokhorova – analyst, regular contributor to bbcrussian.com (one response)
May’s change in the ruling team in Russia gave rise to hopes of liberalisation in public discourse. Signs appeared that open debate on ways of modernising the country might be tolerated, even encouraged, by the authorities. Alas, these hopes were short-lived. Very quickly it became clear that the media are committed, under the banner of “sovereign democracy”, to preserving an unchanged political course. Accordingly, television has not shifted one inch towards performing its normal functions, viz. holding up a mirror to society and giving a critical analysis of the current state of affairs. It remains, instead, a powerful instrument of propaganda and persuasion in the hands of the ruling elites.
That it was “business as usual” became apparent in mid-July when President Medvedev unveiled a “new” foreign policy doctrine before a formidable gathering of 250 Russian ambassadors. Numerous comments and interpretations followed, guiding the public through the intricacies of the modern challenges facing the country. Summing up the President’s message, Russia’s ambassador in Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov told Channel One that Dmitry Medvedev had reiterated the need for an “offensive, even aggressive foreign policy”.
TV commentators noted some new points. The new doctrine no longer refers to the Union of Russia and Belorussia, for instance. Until now this bizarre conglomerate has popped up in the media every time it was necessary to reassure the population and to show Nato and the EU that Russia has its own alliances. Britain has ceased to be one of Moscow’s major partners in Europe. India, China and Brazil, on the other hand, are now officially declared strategic partners.
In his speech Medvedev stressed that Russia, in principle, should “pursue a conflictfree foreign policy”. An expert was asked by the TV Centre channel how to reconcile such contradictory notions, a foreign policy that was both “conflict-free” and “offensive”. Yevgeny Kozhokhin, director of Moscow’s Strategic Studies Institute, suggested that in the modern world Russia’s objective of ensuring a conflict-free environment can often only be achieved by offensive means (TV Centre, “25 Chas”, 15 July).
On another occasion a TV Centre anchorman pointed out that a new assertive role as one of the world’s leading powers also gives Russia a responsibility for proposing practical solutions to outstanding problems, for example the “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union. This led to a discussion of the latest peace initiative for Georgia and Abkhazia by German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The presenter dismissed the plan because it envisages a return of the Georgian refugees at an early stage in a step-by-step blueprint for the conflict’s resolution. For more arguments against the German proposals the presenter turned to Andranik Migranyan. One of the Kremlin’s leading spin doctors, Migranyan was recently despatched to New York to head the North American branch of the socalled Democracy and Cooperation Institute, a new network of State-supported think-tanks tasked with monitoring the state of democracy in the West. Steinmeier’s proposal was useful in calling for a rejection of military force as a means to resolve the conflict, commented Migranyan. He warned that the plan was biased, however, as it stipulated the return of the refugees as a first step, followed by Western investments. This left the issue of the region’s political status till a later stage. Such a sequence would bring about a major demographic shift in favour of the Georgian population, argued Migranyan (TV Centre, “Postscriptum”, 19 July).
As a whole, Russian television reflects a resentment widespread in Moscow’s political circles whenever the West crosses the notorious “red lines”, or “No Go” areas, which Russia itself has laid down. Another “red line” is the proposed US missile defence system in Central Europe. The visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Prague, and the signature of the agreement to deploy the US radar in the Czech Republic, triggered a tide of irate declarations by Russian officials matched by vitriolic comment on television. Several TV channels broadcast reports of mass rallies in Prague, with protesters calling the agreement a selling “into bondage” for the nation and a loss of sovereignty (NTV, “Segodnya”, 8 July). Russia’s spin doctors widely exploit conspiracy theories in relation to these US plans in Europe. RTR, the country’s second national TV channel, reported a useful argument supporting this theory recently voiced by Jiri Mastalka, a Czech MEP. “The US is seeking to control states and territories that are rich in resources,” he said. “Not only oil and gas, not only defence resources, but water as well. And there is only one such territory, namely Russia,” (RTR, “Vesti Nedeli”, 13 July).
The European Union features mainly on Russian television in a negative light, a block of countries with great ambitions but mired in a profound systemic crisis. By way of illustration TV programmers exploited to the full the repercussions of the Irish “No” vote to the Lisbon Treaty. National TV channels hurried to report that the Treaty was encountering immense opposition across Europe, especially in the Czech Republic and Poland, and therefore was doomed (NTV, “Segodnya”, 1 July). The EU also featured in a series of newscasts about the arrest of Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadzic. The main conclusion was that the West, Europe in particular, was heavily biased against Serbia: blame for the atrocities in the last Balkan war was placed wholly on Belgrade while perpetrators from the Bosnian or Albanian side remained at large. NTV showed Serb nationalist leader Tomislav Nikolic accusing his country’s government of “surrendering a national hero to win a few points in Brussels”, in the hope of securing a clear passage to membership (NTV, “Vesti”, 23 July).
Some commentators claimed that the Karadzic arrest had been orchestrated and stage-managed by the Western secret services, since for three days after the arrest his whereabouts were unknown to the Serb police. According to a presenter on the Vesti news channel, the Serb parliament broke up for an unexpected recess in order to prevent an outbreak of public indignation against “selling out Serbia to the West” (NTV, “Vesti”, 23 July).
As concerns individual EU member states, they are customarily classified on most nationwide TV channels as either friends or enemies of Russia. This time Italy was a friend, following a meeting in Moscow between Dmitry Medvedev and Giorgio Napolitano, the Italian President. The latter was widely quoted as supporting Medvedev’s idea of launching multilateral consultations to draw up a new security treaty for Europe (Channel One, “Vremya”, 16 July). The group of enemies is invariably led by Britain. Anti-British rhetoric on television followed a new exchange of ripostes by Moscow and London in their year-old war of words. This time TV commentators rebuked Downing Street, after MI6 allegations that the Russian State was behind the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, the former Russian KGB agent poisoned with polonium. Very promptly, Russian secret services exposed a presumed British spy working under the guise of a counsellor at the UK’s Moscow embassy. Some reports hinted vaguely that he was also somehow implicated in the BP-TNK affair. Russia’s ambassador in the UK described the cause of tension between Moscow and London: “there is a faction, a group of forces in Britain, that wants to prevent the normalization of our relations. I mean the political sphere above all since everything is going very well in the economic domain,” (NTV, “Segodnya”, 11 July).
Unsurprisingly, the group of Russia’s enemies within the EU includes Estonia. This time its President Toomas Hendrik Ilves dared to suggest in a formal speech that Russia’s Karelians, like Estonians members of the Finno-Ugric family of ethnic groups, may also “choose freedom” one day. A newscast on TV Centre reported this event as “An Estonian provocation at Presidential level” (TV Centre, “Postscriptum”, 12 July). Like Estonia, Lithuania is seen as a country seeking to rewrite history and thus split the ranks of the EU. A new wave of criticism against the Baltic state on Russian television was prompted by the Lithuanian parliament’s decision to ban Soviet symbols in a move implying equivalence between the Soviet regime and Nazi Germany. A commentator on TV Centre pointed out that “a large part of Lithuania’s present leadership were people who lived very well under the Soviet regime … Twenty years ago many of them were staunch Communists,” (TV Centre, “Postscriptum”, 12 July).
Such stark images of the world appear too primitive to accommodate certain political developments, but in that case they either do not make it to the TV screen or leave more questions than answers. Take the interpretation of Bulgaria’s foreign policy. Russian propaganda has more or less digested the fact that Bulgaria, a historic ally and a fraternal Slavic nation, is now part of the Trans-Atlantic space. Sofia’s move to recognize Kosovo, however, was met with some bewilderment. REN TV, one of the few semi-independent national channels, merely remarked that “the policy of the Balkan diplomats has become bizarre: Bulgaria alongside Croatia has recognized Kosovo’s independence, which complicated relations with Russia.” No analysis was attempted as to why Bulgaria took this decision (REN TV, “24”, 7 July).
*
When introducing his hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin promised a continuity of the Kremlin’s political course. Russian television provides an impressive illustration that he has kept his word. Not only does the course remain unchanged: the arsenal of clichés, propagandistic myths and stereotypes which were worked up by mainstream political technologists to justify the reversal of democratic reforms also remains in use.
The notion of modernisation, launched by Dmitry Medvedev at the outset of his presidency, is interpreted (at best) by the Russian political elite as a reference to modernising the country’s industrial infrastructure. As regards Russia’s relationship with the outside world the issue of modernisation does not seem to feature. There it is the language of “red lines”, and “aggressive” or “offensive” foreign policy, that prevails.

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On Thursday July 9, The Nixon Center hosted a panel of experts to assess President Barack Obama's recent meetings with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The panel consisted of The Honorable Richard Burt, Managing Director at McLarty Associates and a former U.S. Chief Negotiator in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); Andranik Migranyan, Director of the New York Office of Russias Institute for Democracy and Cooperation; and Dimitri K. Simes, President of The Nixon Center. The discussion was moderated by distinguished journalist and Harvard professor Marvin Kalb.