Time for the Human Approach / ISN

17 November 2010

Time for the Human Approach

Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary General

Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal for a new post-cold war security order offers a significant opportunity for the world. But both the West and Russia need to move on from conventional security logic, and think in terms of the human.

By Javier Solana and Mary Kaldor for openDemocracy

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Recently, there has been much talk of a 'reset' in the West's relations with Russia. It was started by President Obama but has been taken up by President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel and, in the last week, by the Secretary General of NATO. But rather little has been elaborated about what this 'reset' might mean or how Western countries might respond to the proposal by president Dmitri Medvedev for a new European security architecture, first put forward in June 2008. Medvedev also published a draft European security treaty in November 2009. In a paper presented in Moscow today, we will be arguing that the EU should seize the opportunity offered by Medvedev's initiative and the new interest in revising and rethinking relations with Russia to propose a human security architecture for Europe.

U.S. Nukes in Europe Unnecessary - Council on Foreign Relations

U.S. Nukes in Europe Unnecessary - Council on Foreign Relations

U.S. Nukes in Europe Unnecessary

Author:	Micah Zenko, Fellow for Conflict Prevention

November 17, 2010

When NATO leaders gather in Lisbon this weekend to endorse the alliance's new Strategic Concept, the most contentious component will be the role assigned to U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.The Obama administration (incorrectly) claims that America's nuclear umbrella over NATO requires tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and (justly) asserts that reductions in U.S. bombs in Europe must be matched by limitations of Russia's vastly larger tactical nuclear arsenal.
In squaring these positions, the United States should bring home its two hundred nuclear weapons from Europe.

Flashback: Russia Backs Yanukovych in Ukraine’s 2010 Elections - The Jamestown Foundation

Russia Backs Yanukovych in Ukraine’s 2010 Elections - The Jamestown Foundation

Russia Backs Yanukovych in Ukraine’s 2010 Elections

Publication: Volume: 7 Issue: 20

January 29, 2010 03:39 PM Age: 17 days

Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Domestic/Social, Foreign Policy, Russia, Ukraine

By: Taras Kuzio

Russian media coverage of the 2010 Ukrainian elections from the outset portrayed it as a two-horse race between Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko. In the first phase of the election campaign (October-November 2009), the Russian media did not express a preference, but since the first vote the media and ruling Unified Russia party had endorsed Yanukovych (Rossiya 1, NTV, October 19, 24, 27, November 12, 16, 22).

A recent poll by the Russian Public Opinion Foundation found that 53 percent of Russians believe that Yanukovych will be elected as Ukraine’s next president and only 14 percent expect that Tymoshenko will triumph (Kyiv Post, January 28). While 47 percent consider that relations with Ukraine will improve if Yanukovych is elected, only 8 percent expect the same from Tymoshenko. In the first phase of the campaign, the Russian media remained neutral towards Tymoshenko, but also ridiculed her because of her alleged obsession with her image and preference for spectacle. The gender bias was evident when the Russian media mocked her tendency to pick on what it considered as trivial matters that are presumably only of interest to women (with men presumably taking care of more substantial issues). During the flu crisis and gas negotiations with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Russian media coverage shifted its emphasis on Tymoshenko towards that of a dynamic politician. It positively portrayed her pragmatism in seeking to work with Moscow on energy issues, a welcome development in Russia and the EU after two winter gas crises in 2006 and 2009. On November 22, 2009 Rossiya 1 described her in positive terms, as cultivating a breakthrough in Russian-Ukrainian energy relations and Putin’s relationship with Tymoshenko as a step forward compared to President Viktor Yushchenko.

The visual hatred which Moscow has displayed toward Yushchenko is disingenuous in that it has downplayed the fact that Tymoshenko was a key player in the 2004 Orange Revolution, which Russia sought to halt. Tymoshenko uses Orange rhetoric in the 2010 elections and has drawn on the support of pop stars to revive the image of the 2004 Maidan, where music and carnival sustained protestors for 17 days in wintry weather.

In the second phase of the election campaign, the Russian media moved towards a far more favorable endorsement of Yanukovych, becoming Moscow’s favorite as a “pro-Russian.” His support for Russian foreign policy included supporting the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Ukraine’s membership of CIS institutions, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Single Economic Space Customs Union. Tymoshenko, on the other hand, was increasingly portrayed in negative terms or simply ignored by the Russian media. Yanukovych emerged as the favorite candidate on the eve of the first round on the Rossiya 1 channel, where he was featured in 11 of the 13 reports and shown speaking in 10 programs. In all cases he was identified as the frontrunner and the likely winner.

This move to endorse Yanukovych was accompanied by the growing portrayal of the Party of Regions as a positive political force and Yanukovych as a decisive leader who would “take the situation in hand and bring order to the country” (Rossiya 1, December 30). These reports also showed lengthy clips of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kiril’s July 2009 visit to Ukraine where he was escorted by Yanukovych. Russian media coverage presented a glowing picture of Yanukovych’s support for Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security architecture and Ukraine’s membership of the Single Economic Space Customs Union. The media also endorsed Yanukovych as better placed to implement policies that are favorable to Russian interests on NATO, the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian language (Rossiya 1, January 10, 12). However, its coverage largely ignored Tymoshenko during the last phase of the first round campaign, focusing instead on Yanukovych and Serhiy Tihipko who were shown more favorably. Tymoshenko was also contrasted with these candidates by her support for the 2004 Orange Revolution (Rossiya 1, NTV, January 10, 12).

In the run up to the first round the Russian media characterized Yanukovych and Tihipko as the “pro-Russian” candidates who were most favorable to Russian interests –not Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko was either ignored or mocked with the only favorable coverage of her being her pragmatism on energy relations. Yanukovych, in contrast to Tymoshenko, was seen as somebody who would be a better partner for Russia and more reliable, while Tymoshenko was “unpredictable” (Rossiya 1, January 21).

The “Judge for Yourself” talk show on Rossiya 1, attended by Russian and Ukrainian politicians and experts, quoted the Russian political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov as supporting Yanuovych because, “There are certain preferences: Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said that the Unified Russia party has enjoyed closer cooperation with the Party of Regions,” and therefore cooperation with its leader would be more straightforward (Rossiya 1, January 21). Nikonov observed, “They have the same mindset. They are capable of reaching agreements. There is readiness to resolve the issue of the status of the Russian language, for instance.” In addition, Yanukovych has close ties to big business which have strong links with Russia. Other Russian politicians in the television program emphasized Yanukovych’s support for Russian to become a second state language.

Tymoshenko was described on the program as likely to follow Yushchenko as a “puppet of the West,” she opposed elevating the Russian language while her anti-Russian credentials were proven by her 2007 Foreign Affairs article entitled “Containing Russia.” Unified Russia member and Kremlin spin doctor Sergei Markov said, “There is a fear that Yulia Tymoshenko would not express the people’s will, but become a marionette of the external forces that use Ukraine as a tool to do harm to Russia” (Rossiya 1, January 21).

By the first round, Russian politicians and media had endorsed Yanukovych as someone who would do Moscow’s bidding. In contrast, Tymoshenko was not viewed in such a manner. This conclusion undermines Yushchenko’s claim that Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are the same as both are “Moscow projects,” an argument that shows the degree to which Yushchenko’s presidency has elevated personal issues above politics.

Clinton Rejects Russia on New Europe Security Treaty (Update1) - BusinessWeek

Clinton Rejects Russia on New Europe Security Treaty (Update1) - BusinessWeek

Bloomberg

January 29, 2010, 12:15 PM EST

(Adds Clinton quote in last paragraph.)

By Indira A.R. Lakshmanan

Jan. 29 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rejected Russia’s calls for new European security treaties and said American forces will remain on the continent to “deter attacks and to respond quickly if any occur.”

“European security remains an anchor of U.S. foreign and security policy,” Clinton said in a speech today in Paris, adding that “some questions” had been raised in recent months about the depth of the Obama administration’s commitment to Europe.

Clinton dismissed two Russian initiatives seen as a bid to boost Russian influence over countries once part of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and to halt the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s expansion. A plan put forward last month would have effectively given Russia a veto over allied military planning, especially in eastern Europe, said four allied officials who declined to be named.

“The Russian government has put forth proposals for new security treaties for Europe,” Clinton said. “However, we believe that these common goals are best pursued in the context of existing institutions, such as the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council, rather than by negotiating new treaties, as Russia has suggested.”

The OSCE is the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Clinton said that a “cornerstone” of European security is the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states.” She repeated U.S. calls on Russia to honor the terms of a cease-fire agreement that ended the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war and the administration’s refusal to recognize Russia’s claims of independence for the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Spheres of Influence

“More broadly, we object to any spheres of influence in Europe in which one country seeks to control another’s future,” Clinton said, adding that even amid Russian opposition, “NATO must and will remain open to any country that aspires to become a member and can meet the requirements of membership.”

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has accused NATO of violating a 1998 pledge not to permanently station “substantial combat forces” on former Warsaw Pact territory.

NATO absorbed former Soviet allies starting in 1999 -- including three former Soviet republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- at a time when a Russia shorn of its Cold War satellites was struggling to regain its economic footing after defaulting on $40 billion of debt.

Under Putin since 2000, energy-rich Russia has seized on an oil price that peaked at $147 per barrel in July 2008 to revive its economy and gain leverage over oil- and gas-importing states in Europe.

Russia Pushes Back

Russia pushed back against further NATO enlargement with its 2008 invasion of Western-leaning Georgia and attempts to reassert control over Ukraine.

The U.S. will maintain its “unwavering commitment” to Article 5 of the NATO treaty “that an attack on one is an attack on all,” said Clinton.

“As proof of that commitment, we will continue to station American troops in Europe, both to deter attacks and to respond quickly if any occur,” she said.

To be sure, Clinton underlined that even when Russia and the U.S. don’t agree “we will seek constructive ways to discuss and manage our differences.” She noted that “Russia is no longer our adversary” and pointed to Russian-U.S. cooperation on Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea.

She also highlighted progress in discussions on a new START treaty to reduce the size of the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals.

Tre

Cooperate With Russia

Clinton said the U.S. is serious about exploring ways to cooperate with Russia to develop a missile defense system that would provide security for both Europe and Russia.

“Missile defense we believe will make this continent a safer place,” said Clinton. “That safety could extend to Russia, if Russia decides to cooperate with us.”

Clinton called on Russia to back the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and urged the Russian leadership to lift its two- year-old suspension of the implementation of the CFE Treaty. She said an updated treaty should take into account developments since the original treaty was signed in 1990 and include “the right of host countries to consent to stationing foreign troops in their territory.”

The OSCE’s ability to defend and promote human rights needs to be strengthened and it needs a “Crisis Prevention Mechanism” that would allow it to send rapid humanitarian aid and provide impartial monitoring, Clinton said.

NATO has pointed to the 56-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, an East-West forum created in 1975, as the best arena for discussing Russia’s security concerns.

“We are continuing the enterprise we began at the end of the Cold War to expand the zone of democracy and stability across Europe,” Clinton said.

--With assistance from James G. Neuger in Brussels. Editors: Leon Mangasarian, Eddie Buckle.

To contact the reporter on this story: Indira Lakshmanan in London at +1-202-654-1277 or ilakshmanan@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Jim Kirk at +1-202-654-4315 or jkirk12@bloomberg.net

Putin suggests three rules for European security - RT Top Stories

Putin suggests three rules for European security - RT Top Stories:
Published 24 November, 2008, 20:26"
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has described the three rules which he believes must be observed if a new European Security Treaty is to be a success.
Speaking in St. Petersburg at an international conference on problems of humanitarian law, Putin said: “The new European security treaty – the idea of which belongs to President Medvedev – is aimed at guaranteeing real and equal security in Europe based on three principles. Firstly, not ensuring one's own security at the expense of someone else's. Secondly, not undertaking action within military alliances or coalitions that would weaken overallsecurity. And thirdly, not expanding military alliances at the expense of other members of the treaty.”
The treaty should become “a legally binding document, providing real guarantees of ensuring equal security,” he said. “We suggest as well the recording in the new document of the basic parameters of arms control.”
He believes a new document “should reflect the fundamental principle of reasonable sufficiency, as well as mechanisms of cooperation in the struggle against the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, drug trafficking, terrorism and organised crime.”

European security treaty | Top Russian news and analysis online | 'RIA Novosti' newswire

European security treaty | Top Russian news and analysis online | 'RIA Novosti' newswire: "11:3130/11/2009

The Parties to this Treaty,

Desiring to promote their relations in the spirit of friendship and cooperation in conformity with international law,

Guided by the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975), as well as provisions of the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (1982) and Charter for European Security (1999),

Reminding that the use of force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other way inconsistent with the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations is inadmissible in their mutual relations, as well as international relations in general,

Acknowledging and supporting the role of the UN Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to join efforts in order to respond effectively to present-day security challenges and threats in the globalized and interdependent world,

Intending to build effective cooperation mechanisms that could be promptly activated with a view to solving issues or differences that might arise, addressing concerns and adequately responding to challenges and threats in the security sphere,


Have agreed as follows:


Article 1

According to the Treaty, the Parties shall cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security measures taken by a Party to the Treaty individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any international organization, military alliance or coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of all other Parties. The Parties shall act in accordance with the Treaty in order to give effect to these principles and to strengthen security of each other.

Article 2

1. A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in or support any actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.

2. A Party to the Treaty which is a member of military alliances, coalitions or organizations shall seek to ensure that such alliances, coalitions or organizations observe principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Helsinki Final Act, Charter for European Security and other documents adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as in Article1 of this Treaty, and that decisions taken in the framework of such alliances, coalitions or organizations do not affect significantly security of any Party or Parties to the Treaty.

3. A Party to the Treaty shall not allow the use of its territory and shall not use the territory of any other Party with the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed attack against any other Party or Parties to the Treaty or any other actions affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.

Article 3

1. A Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request, through diplomatic channels or the Depositary, any other Party to provide information on any significant legislative, administrative or organizational measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security.

2. Parties shall inform the Depositary of any requests under para.1 of this Article and of responses to them. The Depositary shall bring that information to the attention of the other Parties.

3. Nothing in this Article prevents the Parties from undertaking any other actions to ensure transparency and mutual trust in their relations.

Article 4

The following mechanism shall be established to address issues related to the substance of this Treaty, and to settle differences or disputes that might arise between the Parties in connection with its interpretation or application:

a) Consultations among the Parties;

b) Conference of the Parties;

c) Extraordinary Conference of the Parties.

Article 5

1. Should a Party to the Treaty determine that there exists a violation or a threat of violation of the Treaty by any other Party or Parties, or should it wish to raise with any other Party or Parties any issue relating to the substance of the Treaty and requiring, in its opinion, to be considered jointly, it may request consultations on the issue with the Party or Parties which, in its opinion, might be interested in such consultations. Information regarding such a request shall be brought by the Requesting Party to the attention of the Depositary which shall inform accordingly all other Parties.

2. Such consultations shall be held as soon as possible, but not later than (...)days from the date of receipt of the request by the relevant Party unless a later date is indicated in the request.

3. Any Party not invited to take part in the consultations shall be entitled to participate on its own initiative.

Article 6

1. Any participant to consultations held under Article5 of this Treaty shall be entitled, after having held the consultations, to propose the Depositary to convene the Conference of the Parties to consider the issue that was the subject of the consultations.

2. The Depositary shall convene the Conference of the Parties, provided that the relevant proposal is supported by not less than (two) Parties to the Treaty, within (...) days from the date of receipt of the relevant request.

3. The Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least two thirds of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus and shall be binding.

4. The Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 7

1. In case of an armed attack or a threat of such attack against a Party to the Treaty, immediate actions shall be undertaken in accordance with Article8(1) of the Treaty.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article8 of the Treaty, every Party shall be entitled to consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself. In exercising its right of self-defense under Article51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it shall be entitled to render the attacked Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Information on measures taken by Parties to the Treaty in exercise of their right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the UN Security Council.

Article 8

1. In cases provided for by Article7 of this Treaty, the Party which has been attacked or threatened with an armed attack shall bring that to the attention of the Depositary which shall immediately convene an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties to decide on necessary collective measures.

2. If the Party which became subject to an armed attack is not able to bring that to the attention of the Depositary, any other Party shall be entitled to request the Depositary to convene an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties, in which case the procedure provided for in Para.1 of this Article shall be applied.

3. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties may decide to invite third states, international organizations or other concerned parties to take part in it.

4. The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be effective if it is attended by at least four fifths of the Parties to the Treaty. Decisions of the Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall be taken by unanimous vote and shall be binding. If an armed attack is carried out by, or a threat of such attack originates from a Party to the Treaty, the vote of that Party shall not be included in the total number of votes of the Parties in adopting a decision.

The Extraordinary Conference of the Parties shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article 9

1. This Treaty shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, as well as rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that their obligations under other international agreements in the area of security, which are in effect on the date of signing of this Treaty are not incompatible with the Treaty.

3. The Parties to the Treaty shall not assume international obligations incompatible with the Treaty.

4. This Treaty shall not affect the right of any Party to neutrality.

Article 10

This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok as well as by the following international organizations: the European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Community of Independent States in … from … to ….

Article 11

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States and to approval or adoption by the signatory international organizations. The relevant notifications shall be deposited with the government of ... which shall be the Depositary.

2. In its notification of the adoption or approval of this Treaty, an international organization shall outline its sphere of competence regarding issues covered by the Treaty.

3. It shall immediately inform the Depositary of any relevant changes in its sphere of competence.

4. States mentioned in Article10 of this Treaty which did not sign the Treaty during the period indicated in that Article may accede to this Treaty by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.

Article 12

This Treaty shall enter into force ten days after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification with the Depositary in accordance with Article11 of the Treaty.

For each State or international organization which ratifies, adopts or approves this Treaty or accedes to it after the deposit of the twenty fifth notification of ratification, adoption, approval or accession with the Depositary, the Treaty shall enter into force on the tenth day after the deposit by such State or organization of the relevant notification with the Depositary.

Article 13

Any State or international organization may accede to this Treaty after its entry into force, subject to the consent of all Parties to this Treaty, by depositing the relevant notification with the Depositary.

For an acceding State or international organization, this Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of accession with the Depositary, provided that during the said period no Party notifies the Depositary in writing of its objections against such accession.

Article 14

Each Party shall have the right to withdraw from this Treaty should it determine that extraordinary circumstances pertaining to the substance of the Treaty have endangered its supreme interests. The Party intending to withdraw from the Treaty shall notify the Depositary of such intention at least (...) days in advance of the planned withdrawal. The notification shall include a statement of extraordinary circumstances endangering, in the opinion of that Party, its supreme interests.