Since Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin ascended to the presidency in 1999, the main goals of the Russian state have become clear: reverse the privatization and decentralization of power that occurred in the 1990s and consolidate political control within the Kremlin; reclaim Russia’s role as a major player on the world stage; and reassert dominance over the states of the former Soviet Union. Both the EU and the U.S. find all of these goals problematic.
While the U.S. reset policy has produced some successes, EU leaders should be very clear about what a Russia-reset can and cannot do for Europe. The EU should not expect that Russia, if engaged by an EU policy reset, would come to view its strategic objectives any differently. An examination of the basis for U.S.-Russia reset and what it has accomplished shows why.
The U.S.-Russia reset was based on reducing the acrimony between the two countries, whose diplomatic relationship was at a post-Cold War nadir, and identifying areas of mutual interest. These objectives represent the low-hanging fruit of international diplomacy. Moreover, Russian and U.S. political elites implicitly accept that there are some very big areas of policy difference, but that both sides are best served by focusing on other issues for the time being.
How has the policy been successful? Russia has signed the new START Treaty, which will renew the US-Russian nuclear arms reduction regime, allowed the passage of NATO troops and materiel over and across its territory, begun to participate in international efforts to isolate Iran, and indicated that it may support an anti-ballistic missile system in Europe. These developments benefit U.S. interests and, as such, should be viewed as wins for the Obama administration. But when weighing the benefits of the reset, Europe should bear in mind that none of the US policy victories of the last 20 months undermine or suggest a change in the fundamental Russian interests outlined above. There is no evidence to suggest, for example, that Russia would not favor another gas war with Ukraine, shooting war with Georgia, or vitriolic anti-Western rhetoric if it thought it would serve its core interests.
What have been the failures of the reset policy? Perhaps most significantly, the reset has been unable to slow the marginalization of opposition parties or the silencing of dissenting voices within Russia. Former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov is currently touring the US trying to spread this message. Making a policy “reset” the cornerstone of EU-Russian relations threatens to leave out the important issue of human and civil rights abuses that are perpetrated or condoned by the Russian government. If Europeans care about moving Russia closer to liberal democratic norms, they need to understand that “reset” has not been an effective way to do so.
Reset proponents often identify a general moderation in Russian behavior on the international stage over the last two years. But there are two reasons why this period of moderation should not be misinterpreted. First, two years is a very short time to draw conclusions about efficacy of policy or to predict future behavior in international relations. In fact, two years ago the shooting in Georgia had just barely stopped; indeed, Russia continues to station troops in the Georgian separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, thus violating the territorial integrity of a sovereign state. Second, there are compelling reasons other than US action that explain why Russian policy has moderated in the past few years.
Lower commodity prices have resulted in a weakened financial position for Russia, an exporter of oil and natural gas, limiting its ability to throw its weight around internationally. Additionally, Russia no longer faces an openly hostile government in Ukraine and trounced Georgia, a Western ally and anti-Russian government, in the 2008 war. Finally, with each passing year, dissent is further extinguished in Russia and opposition parties have less chance to mount anything but token resistance to Putin’s policies. If any of these developments were to be reversed, there is no reason to think that the moderation trend would not be immediately reversed as the Kremlin turned to its previous tactics to protect core interests.
There is always a case to be made for improving the tone of diplomatic relations and finding areas of compromise, and an EU-Russia reset may do just that. Such steps may even lead to resolution of thornier issues. But neither the Europeans nor the Americans should think that the fruits of a “reset” policy mean that Russia has changed its goals or its tactics in a fundamental way.
This image is being used under Creative Commons licensing. The original source
can be found here.
